On the Cost- Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions by Parker, Richard
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Faculty Articles and Papers School of Law 
2000 
On the Cost- Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions 
Richard Parker 
University of Connecticut School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Parker, Richard, "On the Cost- Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions" (2000). Faculty Articles and Papers. 
428. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers/428 
THE COST EFFECTVENESS OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
RICHARD W. PARKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For over one hundred years, the attraction of economic sanctions as
a middle path between talk and violence has prompted the use of
sanctions for a wide variety of purposes ranging from weakening
adversaries, toppling governments, and promoting human rights1 to
opening foreign markets, promoting intellectual property,2 and protect-
ing the global environment.
3
* Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center (2000), Professor of Law, University
of Connecticut School of Law. J.D. (1985), Yale Law School; D.Phil., Politics (International
Relations) (1982), Oxford University. An expanded version of this paper appears in Richard W.
Parker, The Problem with Scorecards: How (and how not) to Measure the Cost-Effectiveness of Economic
Sanctions, 21 MICH.J. INT'L L. 235 (2000).
1. Although the United States is a frequent user of sanctions, it is not the only user. Of the
116 post-World War I foreign policy sanctions episodes examined by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott
through 1990, 39 cases involved exclusively non-U.S. sending states, and the authors admit they
probably missed a number'of cases involving foreign 'senders' of sanctions. GARY C. HUFBAuER ET
AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORYAND CURRENT POLICY 8-9 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinaf-
ter ECONOMIC SANCTIONs RECONSIDERED]; see also GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 13-20 (1st ed. 1985) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.)] (listing the 103 cases analyzed in that edition).
2. The most frequent user of this type of economic sanctions has been the United States,
followed by the European Union. Since 1974, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 has authorized
the President to retaliate against foreign trade practices that infringe GATT rights orare otherwise
'unreasonable.' Bayard and Elliott report that the United States overtly invoked Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 in 89 separate cases over the period from 1974 to 1992. SeeThomas 0. Bayard &
Kimberly A. Elliott, 'Aggressive Unilateralism' and Section 301: Market Opening or Market Closing?, 15
WORLD ECON. 685, 687 (1992) [hereinafter Aggressive Unilateralism]; Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive
Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 263 (1992).
3. Approximately 20 multilateral agreements currently require or authorize nations to
restrict imports or exports of goods or services to promote some conservation purpose. See WTO
Sub-committee on Trade and Environment, Trade Measures for Environmental Purposes Take Pursu-
ant to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Recent Developments (note by the Secretariat) (Oct. 13,
1994), PC/SCTE/W/3, at http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/search.html. In addition, the United
States has, on occasion, used or threatened unilateral trade restrictions to promote a wide variety
of conservation objectives related to ocean and endangered species conservation. For an overview
of these cases, see Robert E. Hudec, GA TT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures against Foreign
Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 95, 98-106 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert
E. Hudec eds., 1996).
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
In recent years, however, economic sanctions have been subjected to
stricter scrutiny than ever before, due to a sustained media and
lobbying blitz by the U.S. business community under the banner of
"USA*Engage."4 The campaign, begun in 1997, has produced a deluge
of newspaper editorials and stories, virtually all critical of sanctions.5
One result of the campaign has been the introduction (though not yet
the passage) of legislation that would impose procedural shackles on
all new sanctions.6 Most of all, the movement appears to have begun to
alter long-standing attitudes in the public and in Congress, shifting the
historic presumption in favor of sanctions towards a more cautious
approach and perhaps even a presumption against them.7
Powering the USA*Engage campaign, intellectually, are two broad
claims: (1) economic sanctions are costly to U.S. businesses, farmers,
and workers, and (2) economic sanctions are seldom effective and
often counter-productive. 8 These claims of generalized defectiveness
have been used to justify the introduction of the legislation mentioned
above, which would establish a new procedural rule requiring detailed
analysis of the costs to U.S. business balanced against the likely effective-
ness of any proposed new sanction before it is enacted into law.9 The
4. For an overview of this campaign and its message, see USA*Engage-About Us, available at
http://www.usaengage.org/ background/about.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2000).
5. For a small sampling, see Richard Lawrence, Sanctions Debate Enters Critical Phase, editorial,
J. COM., Aug. 2, 1999, at 8; Michael S. Lelyveld, Business Fights Sanctions Tide; Trade Council to Address
Impact on Economy, Jobs, J. CoM. Feb. 4, 1997 at IA; Gary Hufbauer, The Snake Oil of Diplomacy: When
Tensions Rise, the U.S. Peddles Sanctions, WASH. PoST, July 12, 1998, at CI [hereinafter Snake Oil];
Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Learns How to AngerFriends While Failing to Influence Enemies, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1997, at A6;Jack R. Payton, U.S. Sanctions: Talk Softly, Cany No Stick, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,July 21,
1998, at 2A; Barbara Slavin, Sanctions May Be Losing Favor As Top Policy Weapon, USA TODAY, June
25, 1998, at 1OA; Louis Uchitelle, Who's Punishing Whom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at DI. For a
more comprehensive listing of anti-sanctions news stories in 1999, see USA*Engage, Editorials &
Op-eds, at http://www.usaengage.org/resources/ editorcomm99.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2000).
6. See, e.g., The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 1061h Cong. (1999); Enhancement of
Trade, Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 2708, 105th Cong.
(1997).
7. As Richard Lawrence observed in the Journal of Commerce on August 2, 1999, "Congress'
attitude toward sanctions appears much changed from only a short time ago. In September 1997,
roughly 20 bills advocated tighter sanctions. Now, of roughly three dozen bills pending, most
would rescind sanctions or reform the sanctions process." Lawrence, supra note 5, at 8.
8. See Sanctions Revisited: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the Comm. on
Int'l Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 44 (1998) (testimony of Frank Kittredge,
Vice Chairman for USA*Engage) [hereinafter Kittredge Testimony]; USA*Engage, The High Costs
of Unilateral Sanctions, at http://www.usaengage.org/studies/costs.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2000).
9. SeeS. 757§6(d)(1).
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bill also would require on-going review of the costs and effectiveness of
sanctions that have been imposed.'0 The bill would automatically
sunset every sanction after two years unless it is affirmatively re-enacted
by Congress.1' Finally, the bill would give the President broad authority
to waive sanctions the President determines to be too costly or ineffec-
tive. 
2
While the requirement for close scrutiny of the costs and benefits of
sanctions seems unopposable, at least superficially, it does bring a
difficult question to the fore: how to judge the cost and effectiveness of
sanctions, either ex ante or ex post? That is the issue this Article. will
consider, beginning with the cost of sanctions.
II. COST
Although news stories and Internet sites abound with anecdotes of
contracts and sales lost to economic sanctions, by far the most widely
cited and influential estimate of the costs of high foreign policy
sanctions to the U.S. economy overall is the one prepared by Hufbauer,
Elliott, Cyrus, and Winston (HECW) in 1997." Scores of newspaper
and magazine stories, editorials, scholarly writers, and congressional
testifiers have quoted the central HECW finding: U.S. economic sanc-
tions cost the U.S. economy $15 to $19 billion in lost exports and
200,000 to 260,000 in lost U.S.jobs during 1995. " The model on which
the authors base this prediction is well-established, but the numbers
reported above are fundamentally misleading in a number of respects.
To begin with, there is the matter of perspective. Seldom, if ever, do
public reports of the HECW findings place them in the perspective of a
$7 to 8 trillion U.S. gross national product.' 5 Yet expressing costs and
10. See id.
11. Id. § 7(d)(1)(C).
12. See id. § 9(a).
13. GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., U.S. ECONOMIC SANTInONs: THEIR IMPACT ON TRADE, JOBS AND
WAGES (working paper) (Apr. 1997), at http://www.iie.com/CATALOG/ WP/1997/SANCTION/
sanctnwp.htm [hereinafter SANCTIONS COSTS].
14. See, e.g., Richard J. Mahoney, Limited Rok for Government, J. COM., Jan. 22, 1998, at 7A;
Sanctions FeverJ. COM.,June 22, 1998, at 6A (editorial); Daniel W. Drezner, Serious about Sanctions,
53 NAT. INT. 66; David R Francis, Not Just a World Cop, US Spends Big to Keep Peace CHRISTIAN Sci.
MoNTOR (Boston), Dec. 2, 1998, at 1; Paul Magnusson, Getting a Grip on Trade Sanctions, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 17, 1997, at 115;John Shaw, Sanctions: Enough Already, CHmSTIAN So. MONITOR (Boston), Apr.
28,1999, at 11.
15. GNP was $7.3 trillion. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ECON. AND STAT. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1998, at 456, tbl.721 (1998). 1998 GNP was
reported to be $8.5 trillion. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Dep't of Commerce, Gross Domestic Product:
2000]
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impacts of sanctions as a ratio of GNP is the time-honored way of
gauging the impact of sanctions on economies as a whole. While the
average reader might be shocked by reports of sanctions costing $20
billion per year, she might find herself somewhat less dismayed-
assuming sanctions cumulatively accomplish anything beneficial-to
learn that something less than one-third of one percent of GNP has
been set aside for sanctions.
Moreover, even the $20 billion expense and the 200,000 job-loss
figures may well overstate the true cost of sanctions to the U.S.
economy. Under current conditions of full employment, significant net
job loss is impossible almost by definition. Therefore, as the HECW
study recognizes, the actual loss in 1995 was more likely zero jobs lost
and $800 million to $1 billion per year of income loss, a figure that
represents the export sector wage premium that the authors believe is
sacrificed when export sanctions foreclose export opportunities.' 6 Of
course, $1 billion is only five percent of $20 billion and only about
one-seventieth of one percent of 1995 GNP, yet the $1 billion figure is
almost never reported. 17 Indeed, even the $1 billion figure may be too
high since it assumes, counter-factually, that exports lost to country A
cannot be diverted to country B. For example, some exports denied to
Iraq can be, and are, sold in other countries, thereby salvaging some of
the export wage premium.
On the other hand, neither the $20 billion nor the $1 billion figure
captures any of the "unreliable supplier effect"-the tendency of
foreign purchasers to abstain from placing new orders with companies
deemed "unreliable suppliers" due to the export policies of their
parent governments. How significant is the omission? There is little
reason to doubt that reliability concerns have cost U.S. companies some
Fourth Quarter 1998 (Final) (News Release) (Mar. 31, 1999), at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/
newsrel/gdp498f.html.
16. See SANCrONS COSTS, supra note 13, at 7.
17. See, e.g., Kittredge Testimony, supra note 8; Donald V. Fites, From Isolation to Engagement:
The Case Against Unilateral Sanctions, in CEO SERIES, at 4 (Ctr. for the Study of Am. Bus., No. 18,
Nov. 1997) ("A study released earlier this year by the Institute for International Economics found
that in 1995 alone, between 200,000 and 250,000 U.S. jobs were lost due to unilateral U.S. trade
sanctions that reduced our exports to 26 target countries by an estimated $15 billion to $20
billion."); Slavin, supra note 5. In some fora, Hufbauer and others are careful to qualify their cost
estimates with appropriate caveats. Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions: A Primer
for Journalists, 87 ThE QuiLL, Jan/Feb. 1999, at 21 (qualifying the $20 billion figure by explaining
that in a full employment economy the net wage loss is the lower figure of $800 million to $1
billion). But see Snake Oil supra note 5, at C4 (offering the $15-20 billion and 200,000 job loss
estimate without caveat).
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lost sales, and sanctions do raise questions of fairness for individual
businesses who are singled out for special burdens. However, the
HECW study looked for clear evidence of unreliable supplier effects in
the macroeconomic numbers and found none.' 8 There is, indeed, no
available empirical support for the proposition that the cost of export
sanctions to the U.S. economy is large enough to be a matter of national
concern. The fundamental issue for sanctions policy is not so much
their economic cost, as whether they advance their policy goals at an
acceptable political cost to U.S. leadership. This leads to the question of
effectiveness.
III. EFFEcIwENTEss
Effectiveness must be defined in relation to goals. In this article,
usage of the term "effectiveness" refers to the contribution of sanctions
to the goal of changing foreign state behavior in the direction desired
by the sanctioning state. "Effectiveness" does not refer to effectiveness
in self-expression or in satisfying domestic political demands.' 9
A moment's reflection will reveal that there are three main ways one
might go about substantiating assertions about the effectiveness of
economic sanctions: anecdotes, case studies, and "scorecards." Anec-
dotes make good speech material, but they obliterate nuance and
context; they can illustrate points, but they do not prove anything. Case
studies supply the crucial details omitted by anecdotes, but case studies
18. Compare THE PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCrIONS: A REvIEW OF
EXISTING SANCTIONS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
POLICY AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT, app. II (June 1997) (offering examples of lost U.S. export sales
due to "unreliable supplier" effects arising from sanctions); USA*Engage, The High Cost of
Unilateral Sanctions, sec. 2A, at http://www.usaengage.org/studies/costs.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2000) (citing "power generation industry estimates that it takes seven to ten years to re-establish
market share after sanctions have been imposed and lifted" along with other anecdotal examples
of unreliable supplier effects), with SANCTIONS CosTS, supra note 13, at 5 (finding no clear evidence
of unreliable supplier effects in macroeconomic statistics). For a review of the search for hard
economic proof of the pollution-haven theory, see ROBERT REPETrO, JoBS, COMPETITIVENESS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: WHAT ARE THE REAL ISSUES? (1995); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
EnvironmentalFederalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 628-33 (1996).
19. This approach deliberately departs from Baldwin's line of defense of sanctions as
signaling and expressive devices aimed at domestic audiences and at the target state. DAVID A.
BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAIr (1985). There is much to be said for treating sanctions as
speech-mechanisms for dissociating sending states from immoral and harmful conduct by target
states. The exclusion of speech values in this analysis is solely for reasons of analytical interest:
sanctions almost by definition achieve their speech goals, but they do not always achieve helpful
change in foreign behavior.
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are difficult to digest. Moreover, the case studies that have been done
so far suffer from a crucial failing: they do not follow a constant format,
test the same propositions, or look at the same variables. This makes it
very difficult to arrive at case-to-case comparisons or to extract general
conclusions from the studies that have been done.
The deficiencies of anecdotes and case studies point to the attrac-
tions of scorecards, which examine the success of sanctions across a
wide spectrum of cases in a given issue area. Scorecards thus avoid the
problem of selective focus that anecdotes present. They also systemati-
cally examine the influence on success or failure of the same variables
in each and every case, thereby facilitating inter-case comparisons.
Most of all, scorecards employ quantitative methods to test hypotheses
and report results. They distill a vast range of experience into a few
easy-to-report and easy-to-remember numbers, which seem to carry the
authority of science.
By far the most influential empirical study of the effectiveness of
economic sanctions is Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's (HSE's) monu-
mental work, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, which has been cited in at
least eighty-five national magazine stories, one hundred major newspa-
per articles or editorials, and sixty-six law review articles, since it first
appeared.2 0 Not surprisingly, the study is a sanctions scorecard. Now
entering its third edition, the analysis examines over one hundred
cases in which sanctions were used for foreign policy purposes during
this century. It finds an overall sanctions success rate of thirty-six
percent and a forty percent success rate for sanctions involving "modest
policy goals," though the authors observe a sharp decline in the
effectiveness of sanctions since 1973.21
Besides calculating the "success rate" of sanctions, the HSE study also
uses quantitative techniques to correlate the level of success in each
episode with at least fifteen independent variables that are thought to
influence success.2 2 This yields the study's famous Nine Command-
20. See sources and cites collected in Parker, supra note *, at 252 n.53.
21. ECONOMIC SANCIONS RECONSIDERED (lst ed.), supra note 1, at 80-81.
22. The independent variables are (1) time; (2) nature of policy goal; (3) occurrence during
world war; (4) accompaniment by covert action, or not; (5) accompaniment by military force, or
not; (6) index of international cooperation; (7) existence of third-party assistance to target, or
not; (8) index of prior relations between sender and target; (9) length of sanctions episodes in
years; (10) index of political and economic health and stability of target; (11) cost of sanctions to
the target, expressed as a percentage of GNP; (12) pre-sanction trade linkage between target and
sender, expressed as percentage of target's total trade; (13) relative size of target and sender
economies; (14) type of sanction; and (15) index of cost of sanctions to sender. ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 1, at 95-102.
[Vol. 32
THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
ments, which have remained largely unchanged through two editions
and have shaped much of the current orthodoxy about the use of
economic sanctions for foreign policy goals.23
The database of cases and studies compiled by HSE represents a
major contribution to sanctions analysis. Nonetheless, there are several
large methodological problems that undermine the validity of the HSE
study as a basis for general conclusions. Moreover, these issues con-
front any and all efforts to apply empirical methods to the study of
sanctions. The remaining discussion will focus on six of these prob-
lems.
A. Selection Bias
Drawing valid inferences from a database requires examining either
the entire population or a randomly chosen cross-section of data
points. The HSE scorecard does neither. With only a handful of
exceptions, it excludes threat-only cases in which either the sender
backs down after issuing a threat or the target backs down and complies
after receiving the threat.24 The former omission is not terribly mate-
rial for policy formulation; no trade harm is done when the sender
blinks, though future credibility may be impaired. The latter omission,
however, includes the sanctions' greatest success stories-cases where
threat alone was sufficient to achieve desired results. The practical
reasons for excluding quiet threat cases are clear and understandable:
23. Compare ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1, at 81-91, with
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 1, at 94-105. The Nine Commandments are: (1)
sender governments should not ask too much of sanctions as they are seldom effective in
achieving major policy change or impairing the military potential of a major power; (2) sanctions
requiring international cooperation are seldom successful, while those seeking modest policy
changes often do not require cooperation from allies to succeed; (3) sanctions against politically
or economically unstable countries are more likely to succeed than those targeted at healthy,
stable countries; (4) economic sanctions aimed at friends and allies are more effective than those
directed against long-time adversaries of the sender country; (5) the longer the duration of
sanctions, the lower the likelihood of success; (6) the more costly the sanctions to the target state,
the greater the likelihood of success; (7) the more sanctions cost the sender, the less likely they are
to succeed; (8) companion measures-covert action, quasi-military, or regular military opera-
tions; and (9) sender governments should think through their means and objectives carefully
before taking a final decision to deploy sanctions. ECONOMIC SANCTONS RECONSIDERED, supra note
1, at 94-105.
24. The HSE study includes six threat cases. USSR v. Romania (62-3); U.S., Canada v. South
Korea (75-1); League of Nations v. Yugoslavia (21-1); League v. Greece (25-1); Western Allies v.
GDR (61-3); and U.S. v. El Salvador (87-3). See ECONOMIC SANCIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 1, at
84-90 tbls.4.3-4.7. However, this tiny sample does not begin to encompass the universe of
threat-only cases in the foreign policy realm over that period.
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these cases are hard to spot, and finding them would require an
enormous amount of rummaging through diplomatic history. How-
ever, leaving them out means excluding a very important category of
success stories from the sanctions database. 25 The net effect is to create
a downward bias on the measured success rate for sanctions.
B. Subjectivity and Proxy Problems
Though the HSE study is famous and much quoted because of its
quantitative and, hence, "objective" analysis and results, the study is in fact
riddled with subjective and often arbitrary assessments. For example, the
study assigns numerical scores to ordinal qualities: success of outcome
(scored 1 to 4), contribution of sanctions to success (scored 1 to 4),
warmth of prior relations between sender and target (scored 1 to 3),
economic health and stability of target (scored 1 to 3), cost to sender
(scored I to 4), international cooperation with sender (scored 1 to 4)26
Where do these numbers come from? The scoring of such variables
requires highly subjective judgments on at least three levels: first,
deciding which case studies to include in the database; second, decid-
ing which passages from each case study to excerpt in the two-or-three-
page scorecard case write-up; and third, arriving at the "number" to
assign to the variables of success, contribution, warmth of prior rela-
tions, international cooperation, etc. Nowhere is the basis for any
scoring disclosed to the reader. Indeed, the authors' scanty excerpts
sometimes reveal contradictory assessments of sanction's success and/or
contribution. 27 Nor is the authors' choice of case studies or subsequent
25. Indeed, threat cases are the "normal" sanctions scenario, except where one or more
states miscalculate. As Eaton and Engers have observed, "In a world of perfect information,
senders never actually resort to punishing. If the measure works, the target shapes up in
anticipation. If not, the sender never threatens it initially." Jonathan Eaton & Maxim Enger,
Paper, Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 409-10 (1999).
26. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1, at 32-33, app. A at 99-102.
27. An example, chosen at random, is case 74-1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st
ed.), supra note 1, app. C at 491-95. It involves U.S. sanctions against Turkey in the wake of the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus, 1974-78. HSE scores the episode a failure for sanctions (outcome
score of one) and the impact of sanctions negligible (contribution score of one). This scoring is
based on two case studies-one by Keith R. Legg and another byAli S. Karaosmanoglu-which, if
anything, seem to support the opposite conclusion. Legg is quoted opining that "[t] he real effect
... of the embargo was to prevent an alteration of the balance of forces in the Aegean Sea." Id. at
494. Karaosmanoglu reports that "[t]he embargo also did great harm to Turkey's armed forces."
Id. These assessments would suggest that, while the sanctions may not have been effective in
rolling back Turkey's gains, they made a significant contribution to preventing or deterring
further aggression by Turkey against the 60% of the island that it did not then control. Such an
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analysis validated by any sort of peer review. Indeed, many of the study's
sources appear to involve little more than journalistic accounts. Yet
controlling the quality of the database is a large undertaking, as is
standardizing the format of case studies and making sure that reliable
values are -found for all the variables that must be measured in
estimating the impact of sanctions.
Subjective scoring raises a further methodological difficulty. In a
now-classic study of the influence of the scientist on the experiment,
Robert Rosenthal has documented the powerful, subconscious and
nearly unavoidable tendency of experimenters to measure even objec-
tive variables with a bias towards their prior expectations.28 This is not a
sign of moral turpitude, but, according to Rosenthal, an unavoidable
human impulse that has been documented in almost every conceivable
scientific situation, ranging from the observation of movements of
earthworms to experiments in telekinesis.29
One way to avoid the perils of subjective scoring is to rely on objective
proxies of key variables. But this raises a further dilemma: finding
measurable proxies that accurately reflect the variables being mea-
sured. This is not always possible, and other studies have gotten
themselves into a lot of methodological trouble by using purportedly
objective proxies that do not clearly approximate the thing being
measured. 0
outcome would hardly be considered a "failure" for sanctions. The HSE study also did not provide
any documentation for its assessment of the prior state of relations between the United States and
Turkey (rated three, the best possible) or the economic health and stability of Turkey (rated two
on scale of one to three). Id. at 495.
Another example is Case 85-1, U.S. v. South Africa (apartheid), in which the study offers
three "assessments" by other authors that economic sanctions against South Africa were effective
and two suggesting that sanctions were ineffective. Without further explanation, the HSE study
scored the case a failure, though the authors were later to opine (based on subsequent events)
that South African sanctions were a success after all. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra
note 1, at 246-48. In Case 65-2, U.S. v. India (1965-67: Agricultural Priorities), on the other hand,
the HSE study scores the outcome a complete success (score of 16), notwithstanding a study which
concluded that "the (leverage] ... enjoyed by the U.S. was not enough to produce total
compliance with U.S. economic reform demands, and it certainly was not sufficient to produce
any visible gains for the U.S. in the diplomatic realm." ECONOMIC SANcTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st
ed.), supra note 1, at 407-08 (quoting Robert L. Paarlberg, The Limits of Food Power: LyndonJohnson's
"Short Tether"Policy Against India, 1965-67, AM. POL. SCI. Assoc. CONVENTION (Aug. 1984)).
28. See ROBRT ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFEcrs IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 16-26 (1966).
29. Id. at 25 ("[lit is difficult to avoid the subconscious tendency to reject for good reason
data which weaken a hypothesis while uncritically accepting those data which strengthen it.").
30. Bayard and Elliott, for example, estimate the impact of five quite different factors: (1)
economic stakes for the sending state; (2) likelihood of counter-retaliation; (3) proportion of
2000]
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Herein lies one of the central ironies of sanctions scorecards and,
indeed, quantitative cost-benefit analyses generally. The analyses con-
jure images of objectivity by offering a parade of numbers and equa-
tions. Buried beneath this veneer of objectivity, however, is the startling
reality that many of the numbers turn out to be assigned values, which
reflect the subjective judgements, biases, and preferences of the re-
searchers. Yet the HSE study appears almost oblivious to this problem
and makes no effort to correct or account for it.
C. Omitted Variables
Despite the multiplicity of independent variables employed in the
HSE study, the authors omit a number of vitally important variables,
and the omission undermines the soundness of their analysis. For
example, the study makes only the crudest allowance for variation in
the target's perception of its own political and economic cost of
compliance with the sender's demands. Yet both theory and common.
sense would suggest that the target state's cost of compliance is a crucial
variable that must be modeled with some accuracy. 1 Related to the
political costs of compliance is another significant variable that the
HSE study likewise fails to take into consideration-the underlying
legitimacy of the goal sought.3 2 The economic impact of sanctions-
again, only crudely modeled in the HSE analysis-can be difficult even
to determine ex post, much less predict. Yet economic impact must be
target's total exports sent to the United States; (4) the nature of the measure complained of
(border restriction, subsidy, or technical/administrative barrier); and (5) the credibility of the
threat. All are modeled by objectively measurable variables. The problem is that the variables
measured are not particularly good proxies for the factors the authors are trying to estimate. For
example, the first variable, economic stakes, is proxied by a dummy which takes the value one if
U.S. pre-sanction trade with the target state is between $10 million and $100 million, and zero
otherwise. This is based on the theory that smal cases-involving products with below $10 million
of pre-sanctions trade-are not credible predicates for retaliation because the U.S. Government is
simply less concerned with them, while /age pre-sanctions trade flows are also less credible
situations for retaliations because in those cases the United States will fear counter-retaliation
against US exports. Bayard & Elliott, supra note 2, at 698-700 tbl.4. But the notion that credibility
of threat flips "on" at the point where the magnitude of pre-sanction trade reaches $10 million
and then flips "off" at trade levels over $100 million must, as hypotheses go, be considered
speculative at best.
31. As Baldwin has emphasized, it is necessary to adjust for the difficulty of the goal (target
state costs of compliance) in each case when tallying the successes and failures of economic
sanctions. BALDWIN, supra note 19, at 133.
32. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGrrlMACYAMONG NATIONS (1990).
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measured accurately, along with the distribution of the sanctions'
impact and the political influence of those helped or hurt by sanctions.
It is likewise imperative that studies better analyze the factors shaping
the political impact of sanctions on target states-that suite of factors
that determine why some sanctions cause target state and third-country
audiences to focus criticism on the target government, while others tend
to mobilize sympathy for the target and criticism of the sender. These
omitted variables are vital to any rigorous analysis of sanctions' im-
pact. 3
3
D. Omitted Interaction Terms
Imagine an investigation of the causes of fire, using econometric
techniques. Following the HSE approach, one would simply plug in a
linear series of separate variables representing (a) a spark, (b) dry
kindling, and (c) oxygen, and then try to estimate the coefficients for
each variable through simple regression.34 Assuming these variables
are randomly distributed with respect to each other-meaning that the
presence of a spark does not affect the likelihood of kindling being
present, which in turn does not affect the likelihood of oxygen being
present-one would find a rather low correlation between each of
these individual variables and fire. In fact, the occurrence of at least
one of the above variables would result in fire only about one in eight
times, on average. However, if interaction terms were inserted into the
equation- combinations of kindling-spark, spark-oxygen, kindling-
oxygen- higher correlations between the combinations and fire would
result. And, if one inserted a term representing the combination of
spark, dry kindling, and oxygen, the measured correlation would be
near perfect. In order for the experiment to arrive at the "right" result
about the causes of fire, the hypothesis must reflect physical reality;
fires are caused by a combination of circumstances-kindling, spark,
oxygen- occurring simultaneously.35
This simple example illustrates a further difficulty in the HSE
analysis; it fails to examine interaction effects. "Successful" sanctions
would seem to require the simultaneous occurrence of a combination
of circumstances: in simplest terms, a credible threat to impose costs
33. For a more complete discussion of these variables, see Parker, supra note *, at 271-72
n.132.
34. See equation specified in ECONOMIC SANCIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1, at
99-102.
35. SeeWnuuAm H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 387-88 (3d ed. 1997).
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that are greater than the cost of compliance with the sender's de-
mands. Thus, the effect of a sanction costing the target $1 million per
year depends crucially on whether the contemporaneous cost of com-
plying with the sender's demand is $500,000 or $1.5 million. It also
depends on whether the target believes that defying the sender will
elicit a ninety percent, fifty percent, or thirty percent chance of such
sanctions being imposed. Factors like cost of sanctions and cost of
compliance cannot be modeled separately like beads on a string, as the
HSE study does. What is significant is the ratio of expected sanctions
cost to expected compliance cost. Any analysis that looks only at
sanctions impacts and compliance costs in isolation, without taking
account of their inter-relation, is likely to yield seriously flawed results.
E. Problems of Endogeneity
One of the most intriguing and difficult problems that surfaces in
the HSE study is the problem of endogeneity. Endogeneity occurs
when x (an independent variable) affects y (a dependent variable), but
y then turns around and affects x.36 In the present context, endogeneity
may be understood as the problem of self-fulfilling prophecies.
Intuition suggests, for example, that threats of sanctions are more
likely to be successful if they are credible, while actual sanctions are
more likely to succeed if target states believe sanctions will be contin-
ued and perhaps enlarged, absent compliance with the sender's de-
mands. A key factor affecting the credibility of sanctions, however, is
the expectation of the sender about the likely success of sanctions.
The cat is chasing its tail, and that chase has important ramifications
for sanctions scholarship and for policy. For purposes of scholarship,
endogeneity requires sophisticated techniques to account for these
mutually reinforcing effects-techniques that are not employed by the
HSE study and that require certain conditions that may not be met
here.3 7
For policy purposes, the endogeneity problem means that public
analysis of the cost and effectiveness of future sanctions-as the
USA*Engage coalition calls for-is highly ill-advised, for it will alter the
very subject being measured, most probably in a negative direction.
Suppose future aggressors and autocrats know that if they can survive
one year of sanctions, this will generate a negative cost-benefit analysis
in the next annual review that will lead to the lifting of sanctions. That
36. See id. at 712-14.
37. SeeWILAM E. GRIFFTHS ET AL., LEARNING AND PRACTICING ECONOMETRICS 581-609 (1993).
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expectation will certainly give the autocrats a powerful incentive to
hold out. Publicly announcing one's cost-benefit estimate seems a lot
like showing all one's cards in poker, and then disclosing one's view of
the strength of the hand, while the wagering is still proceeding. Why
would anyone do it? Sanctions analysis is fundamentally an intelligence
estimate and ought to be treated as such."'
F. Boundary Problems
Finally, sanctions analysis raises the twofold problem of defining the
boundaries of episodes and establishing the criteria of success. These
problems can be illustrated with an example from the whaling regime.
Charnovitz has documented eight instances in which the United States
threatened trade sanctions under the Pelly Amendment against
would-be whaling states in support of the IWC regime, four of which
involved Norway.3 ° Should these instances be tallied as eight episodes,
five episodes, or one episode?
Similarly, it is well established that, at least until quite recently, all
nations have honored the whaling moratorium with regard to endan-
gered stocks (at least publicly), though a few nations have flouted the
moratorium with regard to plentiful minke stocks.4" How does one
score success in such a case? Was U.S. leverage unsuccessful because it
failed to deterJapan and Norway, in isolated instances, from engaging
in de facto commercial whaling? Or was it successful to the extent that it
reduced Japanese and Norwegian take from what it would otherwise
be, persuaded them to accept observers to monitor compliance, fo-
cused their efforts on clearly non-endangered species, and deterred
38. This does not mean that there can be no congressional oversight of impact assessment
and/or no public report. It simply means that there should be no automatic presumption that an
"ineffective" assessment necessarily leads to the repeal of sanctions, as opposed to alteration or
escalation. And, it means that the key facts and factors that underlie the ultimate policy decision
on sanctions should be kept confidential so that targets cannot game them. Proponents of public
sanctions impact assessment defend the practice by analogy to environmental impact assessment,
which, of course, is done publicly. Richard Haass, Keynote Address: Sanctions Reform? Evaluating the
Economic Weapon in Asia and theWorld, 32 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1,7 (2000). This analogy misses a
crucial difference: the environment cannot and will not alter its behavior based on what the
environmental impact assessment says.
39. Steve Charnovitz, Recent Developments: Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An
Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 751,
763-69 (1994).
40. For an excellent account of the events underlying this example, see David D. Caron, The
International Whaling Comamission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional
Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 154 (1995).
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other states from whaling at all? Were sanctions against Libya unsuccess-
ful, as some say, because they failed for a long time to secure extradi-
tion of the Lockerbie killers? Or were they successful in deterring Libya
and perhaps other states from further acts of airline terror?
What these examples illustrate is that bean-counting approaches
miss the big picture. Sanctions episodes should be viewed broadly and
their effectiveness defined strategically- by the contribution of sanc-
tions over time to the growth of a desirable system of world behavior in
a particular issue area. However, a strategic approach requires a
broader analytical view than can be obtained from case studies and
scorecards that are narrowly focused on individual face-offs between
overt sender and target countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined some of the methodological problems
that bedevil the leading academic study of the cost and effectiveness of
economic sanctions. It is important to understand, however, that these
same problems confront any attempt to look at the impact of sanctions
in a systematic and rigorous way. Whether one employs a quantitative
scorecard or some other approach, the basic requirements of effective
analysis are the same. Effective sanctions analysis requires enlarging the
database to permit investigation of "threat-only" cases. Sound analysis
requires taking a strategic (rather than narrowly tactical) view of the
role of sanctions in shaping the behavior of both target states and states
other than the named target. It means developing sound models of
sanctions behavior, looking at all the variables and their mutual interac-
tions, and developing valid proxies (if quantification is to be at-
tempted) for all relevant variables. It means conducting sanctions
analysis in a way that does not alter the very subject being measured.
Most of all, establishing a sound analytical foundation for sanctions
policy will require greater efforts at objectivity than those exhibited
thus far. No one of relevance to this debate knowingly doctors their
analysis. As seen, however, the problem of epistemological bias (the
so-called "expectancy effect") is pervasive in all aspects of human
endeavor-particularly in situations where highly subjective judge-
ments are required. Yet the current institutional structure for sanctions
analysis contains no meaningful safeguards to promote objectivity and
provides no meaningful peer review to act as a check on error or
subjectivity. Achieving smarter sanctions will require more than better
methodology; it will require procedural and institutional reform.
Faced with such challenges, there are two possible responses. One
response is to shrug off the problem on the theory that foreign policy
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has always been.an exercise in which judgements having vast conse-
quences are made with imperfect information and imprecise analysis.
The second approach-the one advocated by this Article-is to
conclude that sanctions analysis can and should be improved. Sanc-
tions policy is too important to be decided so casually. Smart sanctions
policy requires an enormously subtle and complex calculation, and the
stakes are high. Pharmaceutical companies have been known to spend
many months and millions of dollars in developing a new hair tonic. Is
it unreasonable to suggest that the United States, as a nation, devote a
similar level of resources to the development of sound sanctions
policies?
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